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With the reality of the self established the last chapters are occupied with the deduction of a metaphysic of existence, a metaphysic of values, and a metaphysic of reality. The reality of an absolute self is found to be implied in the reality of the self. This absolute self as a personality is derived from the nature of the subject as experiencing meaning or values. Finally, the worlds of "existence and of value upon which in distinction from each other I have laid so much stress, coalesce in the complete expression of divine purpose and of absolute value."

SAVILLA ALICE ELKUS.

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Natural Rights: A Criticism of Some Political and Ethical Conceptions. DAVID G. RITCHIE. Third edition. London: George Allen and Unwin. 1916. Pp. 300.

This book, first published in 1894 and now appearing without revision, shows inevitably the traces of controversies for the most part forgotten. On the other hand, not only are the general principles discussed of perennial interest, but in several instances particular problems are dealt with which are of present significance. Such, for example, is the consideration of the propriety of limiting the hours of work of railway employees, and of the extent to which liberty should be interfered with in the prevention of strikes.

The theoretical argument of the book is as follows: An appeal is made to natural rights when no legal basis can be found for the attainment of certain desired ends, or, more particularly, for the relief of what is felt to be oppression. The term "natural rights" is ambiguous. Of the various senses in which it has been used, the only legitimate one for political purposes is that of "the more fundamental rights which would be guaranteed by a society which was as it *ought* to be." The determination of the duty of society in this matter is based upon considerations of utility alone, and is relative to given circumstances. The greater part of the book is occupied with a discussion of particular "natural" rights, and is an illuminating commentary upon the difficulties of reconciling actual American practise (based upon utility) with American principles (based upon abstract and absolute rights).

HARRIETT BRADLEY.

NEW YORK CITY.

JOURNALS AND NEW BOOKS

REVUE PHILOSOPHIQUE, March, 1916. *Le rêve dans la littérature moderne* (pp. 209-274): Y. DELAGE. — The writer considers the use made of dreams in the writings of many nineteenth-century

authors, and concludes by indicating "that which is forbidden, that which is permissible, and that which one should demand" in connection with such use of dreams. *La crédulité primitive et ses survivances* (pp. 257-287): TH. RIBOT.—Distinguishes between those whose credulity is permanent and those with whom it is transient or partial; the former are characterized by inaptitude for logical thinking, repugnance to hesitation and doubt, and by finding repose in immediate acceptance and belief. *Une forme de l'automatisme social: la convention* (pp. 288-297): MARC DUFAUX.—Convention signifies a "sentiment, idea, a manner of thinking, speaking, or acting, which conforms or tends to conform to a type or ready-made representation, in accordance with which the collective consciousness demands that the ideas, sentiments, and acts of every one be modelled." Conventions are formed by crystallization of social experience because of a need for simple and universal guiding formulas. *Notes et discussions. Analyses et comptes rendus.* Bertrand Russell, *Our Knowledge of the External World*: M. SOLOVINE. *Varia. Revue des périodiques.*

Conklin, Edwin Grant. *Heredity and Environment*. Second edition. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 1917. Pp. 288. \$2.10.

Morgan, Thomas Hunt. *A Critique of the Theory of Evolution*. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Pp. 208. \$1.50.

Robie, W. F. *Rational Sex Ethics*. Boston: Richard G. Badger. 1917. \$3.50.

Rockefeller, John D., Jr. *The Personal Relation in Industry*. New York. 1917. Pp. 43.

Wallin, J. E. Wallace. *Psycho-Motor Norms for Practical Diagnosis*. Psychological Monographs, Vol. XXII., No. 2. Princeton, N. J.: Psychological Review Company. 1916. Pp. v + 102.

NOTES AND NEWS

A MEETING of the Aristotelian Society was held in London on Monday, January 22, Dr. H. Wildon Carr, President, in the chair. Mr. C. E. M. Joad read a paper on "Monism in the Light of Recent Developments in Philosophy." A monistic theory, he maintained, confuses two quite distinct propositions. A thing is what it is, not only because it has a place in the universe and because of its relations to other things, but also because those relations are not the thing. To assert that a thing is its relations involves a second and quite different proposition. A thing, indeed, presupposes reality and its connections with reality, just as our apprehension of a truth pre-